DRY, et al,

Petitioners,

VS.

CHOCTAW CFR COURT, et al,

Respondents.

No. CIV 98-011-S

The Respondents point to various suits brought by, or against, Petitioners in various courts from the Court of Indian 0ffenses to state courts to federal courts between various parties over the past five-year journey to justice. The one lawsuit overlooked by Respondents is Morrison v. Collier, CIV-95-271 -S, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, and Morrison v. Choctaw Nation, Choctaw Nation Court of Indian Appeals, CA-1, 23 ILR 6093 (1995). The suits mentioned by Respondents, plus the Morrison case, demonstrates that Petitioners are exhausted physically, emotionally, financially and spiritually- and have legally exhausted tribal remedies. That case crystalized animosity between Petitioners, their counsel and then Chief Hollis Roberts.1

The Morrison2 case is a civil case for perspective candidates for chief to receive the names and addresses of registered voters of the Choctaw Nation. On June 7, 1995, this Court issued an order requiring Plaintiff Morrison to exhaust tribal remedies.3 Order attached as Exhibit A. In addition to the U.S. District court suit, Morrison was also appealing within the administrative appeals process of the Department of Interior and in the Choctaw CFR Court of Indian 0ffenses. On July 3, 1995, the Department of Interior issued a decision on releasing the Choctaw voter registration list. On September 23, 1995, seventeen days after the Labor Day arrests of Petitioners, the Choctaw Court of Indian Appeals issued the Morrison v. Choctaw Nation decision, Opinion attached as Exhibit B.

The Morrison decision is significant for two reasons. First, the Choctaw Court of Indian Appeals ruled that the Choctaw CFR Court of Indian 0ffenses does not have jurisdiction under the Choctaw Constitution except to "decide disputes arising under any provision of this Constitution or any rule or regulation enacted by the Tribal Council." 23 ILR 6093, 6094 (June 1996). The appeals court correctly limited the CFR Court of Indian 0ffenses' jurisdiction and did not extend it to general civil, criminal or probate jurisdiction, as the Choctaw voters mandated when adopting the Choctaw Constitution. However, the second reason for the significance of this decision undercuts its ruling. The appeals court was not duly constituted and approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. See Exhibit A to Petitioners' Brief on Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies.

If the Choctaw Court of Indian Appeals was an approved court, the Morrison decision would preclude criminal jurisdiction of the CFR Court of Indian 0ffenses. The fact that the tribe went barreling down the road without approval of the BIA, as required by 25 CFR Part 11, to solve one problem, it created another. The Morrison decision was to stop the release of the voter registration list, but it closed the possibility of legally arresting the Petitioners. Now the tribe wants to legitimize the arrests by arguing they have jurisdiction and we should go back to the CFR court when there is no duty authorized appeals court, and the unauthorized appeals court has already ruled the CFR court does not have criminal jurisdiction to prosecute the Petitioners. It is obvious that the tribal administration wants its cake and eat it too. The Morrison decision, the one decision Respondents did not bring to this court, demonstrates the Choctaw Nation plays fast and loose with justice and Petitioners would not receive fundamental fairness if they were required to go exhaust tribal remedies - or rather those remedies that the Petitioners have not already exhausted and remedies that are still available to them.

Respondents did not address the issue of wardship status and exhaustion. Petitioners are not wards of the U.S. government. U.S. v. Adair, 913 F. SUPP. 1503 (E.D. Okla. 1995). The guardianship responsibility of the federal government is to the tribal entity, not the individual tribal members, such as Petitioners. Rice v. Cayetano, U.S. (February 2000), Justice Stevens dissenting. If legal wards have jurisdiction over non-wards, it would violate due process and equal protection of the U.S. Constitution.

In conclusion, Petitioners have exhausted tribal remedies that exist. In the alternative, forcing non-wards to exhaust remedies administered by wards of the federal government would violate due process and equal protection.

1. Chief Roberts was convicted in this court before this judge of sexually assaulting tribal employees who were also tribal members. U.S. v. Roberts, 904 F. Supp. 1262 (E.D. Okla. 1995). Petitioner Dry represented one of Roberts' victims in a civil suit, Kobi Russ v. Roberts, CIV-9410 1 - S (E.D. Okla. 1994), against Roberts and was represented by the Rabon law firm. Dry was a candidate for chief against Roberts at the time of the arrests in 1995. (back)

2 . The Plaintiff is Scott Morrison, counsel in this case, and was represented by Douglas Dry, the Petitioner in this case. (back)

3. Morrison and Dry has not pursued this lawsuit due to being exhausted by keeping Petitioners out of jail. They had exhausted their tribal remedies at the same time that Dry and Petitioners were arrested. Keeping innocent tribal members out of jail became the priority. (back)

I hereby certify that on this 13th day of March, 2000, 1 placed in first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing to Robert Rabon, Rabon, Wolfe, & Rabon, Post Office Box 726, Hugo, OK 74742.

Attachment I: 1995 Order from Judge Seay Denying Voter Registration appeal

Attachment II: June 1996 Indian Law Reporter