Case No. CIV 98-011-S

DOUGLAS G. DRY, ROSIE BURLISON,
and JUANITA McCONNELL,

Petitioners,

VS.

COURT OF INDIAN OFFENSES
FOR THE CHOCTAW NATION
and JAMES WOLFE, Magistrate

Respondents.

Comes now the Respondents, The Court of Indian 0ffenses for the Choctaw Nation and James Wolfe, Magistrate, by and through their attorney of record, Robert L. Rabon pursuant to Rule 5 of the rules governing 28 U.S.C. §2254 proceedings in the United States District Courts and would respond to the allegations of the petition filed here as follows:

Appellants Douglas Dry, Rosie Burlison, and Juanita McConnell stand charged In the Court of Indian 0ffenses for the Choctaw Nation with violating various provisions of the Choctaw Criminal Code during the Choctaw Nation's 1995 Labor Day festivities at the tribal grounds in Tuskahoma, Oklahoma. See e.g. Petition para. 3. In an obvious attempt to mislead this court, appellants erroneously claimed that during the 1995 Labor Day festivities they were arrested for "[the] supposed violation of a tribal law prohibiting political literature". (See Petition, para. 4). In fact, the appellants were arrested and charged with: Attempting to intimidate a police officer, assault on a police officer, resisting arrest, committing a public nuisance, and disturbing the peace, willfully disturbing a parade, and using profane, violent and abusive language calculated to cause a breach of peace. (See Petitioners' Exhibits 7-11).

The only Choctaw Tribal Council bill that dealt with the distribution of literature was enacted approximately one year after the petitioners were arrested at the 1995 Labor Day Festival and was invalid because it never received B.I.A. approval and is not germane to this case. (See Petitioners' Exhibit 15).

In the body of the original petition filed in this action, petitioners conveniently failed to inform this court that they were charged with the above offenses. Instead, petitioners listed the section numbers of the above offenses, but included the specific charges in the exhibits attached to the petition in an effort to downplay the fact that several of the offenses were extremely serious. In addition, appellant Dry stands charged in the same court with assaulting a police officer during the Tribe's 1996 Labor Day festivities at the same site. (See Petitioners' Exhibit 16) In an attempt to avoid standing trial on those charges, Petitioners have:

(1) Unsuccessfully argued to the Choctaw Tribal [Constitutional] Court -- which has "exclusive jurisdiction" to resolve disputes arising under the Choctaw Constitution, see CHOCTAW CONST. art. XIII, §1 -- that the court of
Indian Offenses lacks criminal jurisdiction over them;1

(2) Unsuccessfully challenged the criminal jurisdiction of the Court of Indian 0ffenses in that court itself;2

(3) Unsuccessfully argued to the Court of Indian 0ffenses (Appellate Division) for the Chickasaw Nation that the Court of Indian 0ffenses for the Choctaw Nation lacks criminal jurisdiction over them;3

(4) Brought a civil suit seeking Bivens and other relief against thirty tribal, municipal, and federal employees and officials (employed at levels as high as the Cabinet of the United States), as well as two Oklahoma municipalities and the United States of America, all of whom are alleged to have committed sundry delicts and/or engaged in various conspiracies against them.4

(5) Brought a civil suit seeking § 1983 and other relief against an Oklahoma municipality, its mayor, vice-mayor, city
council members, and four of its police officers (who were
working for the Choctaw Nation providing security on tribal
lands during the Choctaw Nation's 1996 Labor Day
festivities), all of whom are alleged to have committed
sundry delicts and/or engaged in various conspiracies
against Petitioner Dry.5

After petitioners were charged in the Court of Indian 0ffenses for the Choctaw Nation, they engaged in repeated instances of dilatory tactics by filing frivolous and baseless motions in an effort to delay or avoid standing trial on those charges.6 The following summary of those motions, which Appellants failed to include in their list of exhibits attached to their Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, speaks for itself:

09/28/95 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter in Case No. CR-95-01. (See Respondents' Exhibit 3)

09/29/95 Motion for Disqualification of Trial Judge in Case No. CR-95-01 (See Respondents' Exhibit 4)

10/15/95 Motion for Severance in Case Nos. CR-95-03,

CR-95-04, CR-95-05 (See Respondents' Exhibit 5)

10/30/95 Application for Change of Venue in Case Nos. in CR-95-01, CR-95-02, CR-9503, CR-95-04, CR-95-05 (See Respondents' Exhibit 6)

10/30/95 Motion to Quash and Set Aside in Case Nos. CR-95-01, CR-95-02 (See Respondents' Exhibit 7)

10/30/95 Motion to Quash and Set Aside Information, in Case No. CR-95-05 (See Respondents' Exhibit 8)

01/23/96 Motion to Withdraw Motion for disqualification of Tribal Judge in Case Nos. CR95-01, CR-95-02, CR-95-05 (See Respondents' Exhibit 9)

01/24/97 Amended Motion for Disqualification of Tribal Prosecutor in Case Nos. CR-9501, CR-95-05 (See Respondents' Exhibit 10)

01/24/97 Second Amended Motion for Disqualification of Tribal Prosecutor in Case Nos. CR95-01, CR-95-05 (See Respondents' Exhibit 11)

02/03/97 Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal, in Case Nos. CR-95-03, CR-9504, CR-95-05 (See Respondents' Exhibit 12)

08/04/97 Special Appearance and Motion to Quash Subpoena in Case Nos. CR-95-01, CR95-05, which were prepared and filed by the tribal prosecutor's law partner in response to a subpoena commanding the partner's presence as a witness before the Court of Indian 0ffenses (See Respondents' Exhibit 13)

08/12/97 Withdrawal of Subpoenas Without Prejudice, in Case Nos. CR-95-01, CR-9505 (See Respondents' Exhibit 14)

The case referred to as Dry IV in footnote 4 above was dismissed by virtue of an order entered on September 30, 1998 by the Honorable Michael Burrage, United States District Judge. The case referred to as Dry V in footnote 5 above has not yet been decided, and for reasons set forth above, the criminal charges against Petitioners have not yet proceeded to trial in the Court of Indian 0ffenses. Moreover, Petitioners Burlison and McConnell requested that the respondent Magistrate James Wolfe stay the proceedings in cases CR-95-03, 04, and 05 so they could pursue an appeal in the Choctaw Nation Court of Indian Appeals (See Respondents' Exhibit 12, supra) and Magistrate Wolfe did so. Further delay was caused when appellants' attorney Ms. Morrison insisted that the jury pool be comprised of residents from the "entire population of Southeastern Oklahoma" when the Court Rules for the Court of Indian 0ffenses under the jurisdiction of the Muskogee area office clearly provide that the jury "shall consist of six residents of the vicinity in which the trial is held. (See Respondents' Exhibits 15, 16 and 17) In this setting, Petitioners have now sought habeas corpus relief against the Court of Indian 0ffenses for the Choctaw Nation and its Judge, Hon. James Wolfe in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma.

The twenty-nine page, 110- paragraph Petition presents seventeen counts alleging various defects in the procedures now ongoing in, and the criminal jurisdiction of the Court of Indian 0ffenses for the Choctaw nation, Among the imaginative bases touched in the Petition are arguments that (1) since there allegedly was no "meeting of the minds"7 between the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Choctaw Nation as to what the Court of Indian 0ffenses was to be, the Self Determination Act8 contract pursuant to which the Court of Indian 0ffenses was established was not really a contract at all, Petition para. 36; (2) that Judge Wolfe is not really a judge of the Court of Indian 0ffenses, id. para 58; (3) that the Court of Indian 0ffenses' prosecutor is not realty the Court of Indian 0ffenses' prosecutor, id. para. 66; (4) that the Choctaw Nation Tribal Council is not really the Choctaw Nation Tribal Council, id. para. 62; and (5) that the Chief of the Choctaw Nation is not really the Chief of the Choctaw Nation, id. para. 61. Absent, inter alia, these "understandings", Petitioners submit that the jurisdictional situation necessarily remains "confused". See id. para. 39. But at the core of Petitioners' theory is a premise they have unsuccessfully urged to the Tribal [Constitutional] Court of the Choctaw Nation, the Court of Indian 0ffenses for the Choctaw Nation, the Court of Indian 0ffenses (Appellate Division) of the Chickasaw Nation, the District Court of Atoka County, Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Supreme Court of Civil Appeals, Division 4, as well as this court in Dry IV, cf. supra at pages 2 and 3, nn. 1 -6, (citing cases), but which they continue to urge in Dry V, and the present case ie, Dry V1 now pending before this Court. That premise, in short, is that due to a 1983 tribal referendum that rejected the grant of general civil, criminal, and probate jurisdiction to the Tribal [Constitutional] Court of the Choctaw Nation, no court may exercise the sovereignty of the Choctaw Nation over such matters.9 But Respondents would submit that no such argument has ever been accepted by any court with respect to the jurisdiction of any Indian tribe, and that doing so would essentially stand notions of federal supremacy and preemption on their heads by necessarily concluding that the Code of Federal Regulations, see 25 C.F.R. §11.100(a)(12)(ii)(1997) (recognizing the existence and jurisdiction of the Court of Indian 0ffenses for the Choctaw Nation), was preempted by invisible (and unexpressed) radiation from a 1983 Choctaw Nation referendum. As the Court of Indian Appeals for the Anadarko Area Tribes found to be elementary a decade ago:

[A tribe does not have a choice between having the Court of Indian 0ffenses and no court at all under the federal regulations; whenever a vacuum exists in the enforcement of tribal law, the CFR court will automatically fill the void. A tribe could display the CFR court system by establishing its own tribal court or giving up its jurisdiction to the state under Public Law 280.

Election Board v. Snake, 1 Okla. Trib. 209, 241-42 (Ponca CIA 1988) [1988 WL 5213551.

But apart from the untenability of their overarching jurisdictional attack, the petition suffers from an equally fatal flaw: Petitioners' failure to exhaust their available remedies prior to seeking relief from this court. In this regard, Respondents will fully address the "failure to exhaust" issues in Respondents' Brief which the court has requested be filed by April 21, 1999.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, Petitioners' are not entitled to the relief requested in their petition for writ of habeas corpus.

1 Durant v. Dry, No. C-96-02 (Choctaw Nation, Tribal [Constitutional] Ct., Dec. 3, 1996) [hereinafter "Dry 1"]. See Petitioners' Exhibit 46 (back)

2. Eg., Choctaw Nation v. Dry, No. CRM-95-01 (Choctaw Nation, Ct. Ind. Off., January 24 (1997) [hereinafter "Dry II']; Choctaw Nation v. McConnell, No. CRM-95-03 (Choctaw Nation, Ct. Ind. Off., Jan. 24, 1997; Choctaw Nation v. Burlison, No. CRM-95-04 (Choctaw Nation, Ct. Ind. Off., Jan. 24, 1997. See Petitioners Exhibits 7, 8 and 9 respectively. (back)

3. Dry v. Court of Indian 0ffenses of the Choctaw Nation, No. CIV-96-C27 (Chickasaw Nation, Ct. Ind. Off. (App. Div.), June 12, 1997) [hereinafter "Dry 111"]. See Petitioners' Exhibit 12. (back)

4. Dry v. United States, No. CIV-97-113-B (E.D. Okla. filed Feb. 26, 1997) [hereinafter "Dry IV"]. (back)

5. Dry v. City of Durant, No. CIV-97-344-B (E.D. Okla. filed May 30, 1997) [hereinafter "Dry V"]. (back)

6. In addition, an unsuccessful related lawsuit, of which the petition itself takes notice, see Petition para. 75 & N. 18, involved claims against four Oklahoma municipalities, four municipal police departments, three county sheriffs' departments, the Choctaw Nation, the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Governor of Oklahoma. See Burlison v. Choctaw Nation, No. C-96-198, slip op. (Okla. D.Ct. (Atoka Co.), Aug. 8, 1997, See Respondents' Exhibit 1 In addition, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Court of Civil Appeals, Division 4, Case No. 90,028, affirmed the Atoka County decision on December 29, 1998. See Respondents' Exhibit 2. (back)

7. Petitioners' archaic interpretation of the "meeting of the minds" theory of contract has, of course, been inoperable in the manner they invoke it for generations. See generally, e.g. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986) (back)

8. Indian Self -Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §450 at seq. (West 1983 & Supp. 1997)). (back)

9. The Petition itself notes that Petitioners stand charged with violations of tribal (not federal) law, e.g., Petition paras. 6, 9, and the United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed a centuryold line of caselaw, cf. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382 (1896) (holding that tribal &powers of local government" "are local powers not created by the Constitution"), when it noted that "[United States v.] Wheeler [,435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978),] reaffirmed the long-standing recognition of tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by tribe members," Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 684 (1990). (back)

Certificate of Mailing

I hereby certify that on the 9th day of April, 1999, 1 mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing RESPONDENTS' ANSWER TO PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS to Scott Kayla Morrison, Attorney for Petitioners, 103 1/2 West Main, P.O. Box 637, Wilburton, OK 74578, with postage prepaid.

On April 29, 1997, this matter came on for hearing. The parties appeared with their attorneys. Testimony was taken, evidence received and arguments heard. Now, after fully considering the matter, the Court makes the following findings and orders:

Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the crossdeputization contracts signed by the Defendants are violative of his State and Federal due process and equal protection rights. He also seeks injunctive relief. The Defendants move to dismiss.

Because Plaintiff has failed to properly serve the Defendant B.I.A. pursuant to 12 O.S. 2004(C)(1)(c4), its Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted. However, the remaining issues merit more discussion.

The Choctaws are one of the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians. Their 1860 Constitution was the culmination of at least four previous efforts. They had an elected Chief, an organized system of government and a code of laws. Nevertheless, after 1860, the U.S. Government began a systematic policy of termination and assimilation of the Choctaw and other Tribes. In 1898, Congress passed the Curtis Act, 30 Stat. 495, which forced allotment of tribal lands, made all tribal laws unenforceable, and abolished all tribal courts. Tribal self-government became almost non-existent.

Eventually, the mood of Congress and the public changed. In 1936, Congress passed the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, 49 Stat. 1967, 25 U.S.C. 501 et-seq., reorganizing the Choctaw Tribe, and authorizing its adoption of a new constitution by popular tribal election. In 1967, Choctaws were again allowed to popularly elect their Chief. 84 Stat. 1091.

In 1980, several Choctaw citizens challenged the 1977 Choctaw Constitution in federal District Court, alleging that the 1860 Constitution was still intact. The federal Court ordered the Choctaws to conduct an election to determine the content of a new constitution. Morris v. Watt. 640 F.2d 404 (D.C.1981) One of the questions submitted was whether "the tribal court's jurisdiction would include general civil, criminal and probate matters" and the majority of electors said "no". A new Constitution was drafted in accordance with the election results, and was approved in 1983. Art. XIII, Sec. 1 of that adopted Constitution provides:

"The Tribal Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide disputes, by vote of two (2) membes, arising

under any provision of this Constitution or any rule or regulation enacted by the Tribal Council."

Generally, criminal prosecution in Indian Country has a checkered history. Before Europeans came, Indians made their own laws and were ruled by them. Williams v. Lee. 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959) However, federal incorporation, treaties, and Congressional action gradually limited this inherent power. After the Curtis Act abolished tribal law enforcement and courts, only federal courts could enforcement criminal laws on Indian land, and that enforcement was limited to a dozen major crimes. 18 U.S.C. 1151 et.seq. Most criminal activity in Indian Country went unpunished. In 1953, Congress attempted to fill this gap by Public Law 280 which gave States the authority to assume jurisdiction over all crimes on Indian Land by legislative act. Oklahoma failed to do so. In 1968, Congress amended the Act to require tribal permission. Oklahoma failed to request same.

However, the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. 2801 et.seq., did provide a mechanism for tribal law enforcement. The Act began by recognizing that the Tribes "powers of self government" included "all governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and tribunals by and through which they are executed, including... the inherent power of Indian tribes ... to exercise criminal jurisdiction." That Act provided for the establishment of courts of Indian 0ffenses, a model code to govern
the administration of those courts, and a list of civil rights which mirrored many of those rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. It also provided that the model code contain provisions which would "assure that any individual being tried for an offense by a court of Indian 0ffenses will be advised and made
aware of his rights under the United States Constitution, and under
any tribal constitution applicable to such individual."

Thus, C.F.R. courts were clearly tribal courts regulated by federal law. In 1991, the Choctaws approved a contract with the B.I.A. for a law enforcement program pursuant to this Act, passed a code of offenses, and established a C.F.R. court.

However, C.F.R. Courts were not a complete answer to crimes on tribal land. The Federal government, State and Tribes all had a portion of criminal jurisdiction, often depending on whether the land was "Indian Country" --- a somewhat ambiguous term. Oklahoma had few reservations. Eastern Oklahoma, in particular, was a patchwork of checkerboard tracts and allotments scattered over large areas. Federal officers were few in number, tribal law officers were almost non-existent, and State and local officers
could never be sure of their jurisdictional authority. While State officers could arrest persons for federal offenses, they had no authority to arrest or prosecute crimes within Indian jurisdiction. Langley v. Ryder "' 778 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir.1985) State and local law officers often acted at their own peril of being sued for exercising excessive jurisdiction. Ross v. Neff- 905 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1990) Consequently, many Indian citizens had little protection from lawless acts.

To solve this problem, Congress passed the Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act, 25 U.S.C. 2801 et.seq. That Act authorized Tribes to enter into agreements with Federal, tribal, State or other government agencies for:

"the use of the personnel or facilities of federal, tribal, state or other government agency to aid in the enforcement or carrying out in Indian Tribe that has authorized the Secretary to enforce tribal laws." To facilitate such agreements, the Oklahoma Legislature passed the State Tribal Relations Act, 74 O.S. 1221 et.seq. which authorized the State to enter into cooperative agreements with the Tribes, and the Interlocal Cooperation Act, 74 O.S. 1001 et.seq., which authorized it to enter into cooperative agreements with federal, state, county and city agencies.

In 1994, the Defendants in this case approved a crossdeputization agreement to improve law enforcement in the State and in Indian Country. That Agreement states in part:

"All the parties to this Agreement recognize that when law enforcement officers arrest a criminal suspect, the officers may not know whether the suspect or the victim is an Indian or whether the arrest or the suspected crime has occurred in Indian Country ... The parties further expressly recognize the manifest intent of the Indian Law Enforcement Act to eliminate the uncertainties which previously resulted in the reluctance of various law enforcement agencies to provide services in Indian Country for fear of being subjected to tort and civil rights suits..."

In 1996, Plaintiff was arrested by Choctaw Nation tribal officers for violating Choctaw Council Bill 113-96. He was jailed and charged in C.F.R. court. That Court ultimately ordered the charges dismissed. Plaintiff then participated in a suit (Case No. C-96-2) in the Constitutional Tribal Court requesting a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutional authority of the Nation to establish C.F.R. courts and to enter into crossdeputization agreements. On December 3, 1996, after extensive briefs and arguments, that Court found that the Choctaw Nation had constitutional authority for both. Plaintiff now requests this Court to make the opposite finding. However, he stated here and in the federal removal proceeding that he raises no federal question.

Indians are, of course, U.S. citizens. 8 U.S.C. 1401(a2) As such, they may claim protection under federal and State Constitutions. Although States, with Congressional approval, may generally enter into compacts and agreements as they see fit, these agreements may not diminish or enlarge constitutional rights. 72 Am.Jur.2d "States" Sec.5; Pollard v Hagan. 3 How. 212, 11 L.Ed. 565 If State legislation or agreements have legitimate goals and their classifications are reasonably related to the achievement of those goals, 'they are usually not held to be so arbitary as to violate due process. State v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n., 494 F.Supp. 636;, cert.den. 102 S.Ct. 2902 (D.C. Okl. 1980) When criminal procedure is considered, Due Process basically contemplates an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the nature of the case, before a tribunal having jurisdiction, which proceeds upon notice, with opportunity to be heard, and full power to grant relief. Dodds v. Ward. 418 P.2d 629 (Okl. 1966)

The cross-deputization agreements at issue in this case are clearly designed to protect the public by more efficient enforcement of state, federal and tribal laws. The Court finds nothing repulsive in this goal, nor in the scheme used to achieve it. Moreover, each of the forums involved (state, federal and tribal) provide orderly tribunals for the processing of criminal cases. The fact that the Plaintiff is not satisfied with the outcome of his Constitutional Tribal Court Case is not dispositive. 16 C.J.S. "Constitutional Law" Sec. 964 notes:

"(Due Process) is not a guarantee that every court ruling shall be correct, or that every decision reached will be factual or just, but it is a guaranty that the fundamental principles of justice shall not be violated and that a decision will be reached by processes which are fair. So the constitutional question of due process of law is not involved where the question is the validity of the judgment ..."

For these reasons, the Court finds that these agreements do not violate Due Process.

Plaintiff claims that cross-deputization agreements single tribal members out as a suspect racial class in violation of Equal Protection. However, the unique status of Indian Tribes under federal law permits the federal government to enact legislation singling out tribal Indians, even though the legislation might otherwise be constitutionally offensive. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 States do not enjoy this same unique status. However, the laws enabling crossdeputization agreements are not simply additional State laws. They were enacted in response to a federal measure designed to protect state and tribal citizens.

Historically, the U.S. Supreme Court has used classifications based on tribal status in many of its decisions involving the jurisdiction of Indians. U.S. v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 26 L.Ed. 869 Such classifications are not "suspect" so as to require justification of a compelling state interest for Equal Protection analysis. Morton- v. Mancari supra; U.S. V.-Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 97 S. Ct. 1395, 51 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1977) ; Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979.)Under conventional Equal Protection analysis, legislative enactments are valid unless they bear no rational relationship to the State's objectives. Mass Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 State law "does not violate the Equal Protection clause merely because the classifications (it makes) are imperfect". Dandridge v. Williams. 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed2d 491.

The cross-deputization agreements in this case are clearly designed to promote the State's police power, "eliminate a serious hiatus in law enforcement authority", and ensure the protection of state and tribal citizens. They do so in a far more rational manner than the checkerboard jurisdictional scheme approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in Washington v. Yakima Nation. supra. Thus, Plaintiff's equal protection argument must also fail.

Plaintiff indirectly seeks this Court to review an issue already fully litigated and decided in Tribal Court.

Historically, the courts have divided on how Tribal judgments should be treated for recognition purposes. Some courts have treated these decrees like sister-state judgments (U.S. Const. Art. IV Sec. 1), some like judgments of federal "Territories" (28 U.S.C. 1738), and some like judgments of foreign countries. The Oklahoma Legislature attempted to resolve this problem in 1992 by the passage of 12 O.S. 728. That statute authorizes the Oklahoma Supreme Court to issue a court rule regarding the matter. In 1994, our Court did that by adopting District Court Rule 30, Title 12, Ch. 2 App., which provides that state District Courts shall give full faith and credit to tribal courts who agree to grant state decrees the same reciprocity. Unfortunately, the Choctaw Nation has not elected to do that. See Supreme Court Adm.Dir. No. 94-15.

Therefore, the question of comity must be decided by general principles of law regarding the recognition of foreign judgments.

As a sovereign nation, the Choctaw tribe is not a federal entity, nor does it hold the status of a sister state. For that reason, it is not entitled to the same full faith and credit accorded decrees of those entities. See U.S. ex rel Jackson v.Meyerling., 54 F.2d 621, cert.den. 52 S.Ct. 498; Denton v. Cronin,529 P.2d 644 However, it is entitled to the same deference shown decisions of foreign nations as a matter of comity. U.S.Const.Art. 4, Sec. 1 Generally, foreign nation judgments are entitled to recognition to the same extent and scope as in the courts of the jurisdiction where rendered, if: (1) the foreign court actually had
jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties;(2) the decree was not obtained fraudulently; (3) the decree was rendered under a system of law reasonably assuring the requisites of an impartial administration of justice-- due notice and a hearing; and(4) the judgment did not contravene the public policy of
the jurisdiction in which it is relied upon. Hilton v. Guynt,159 U.S. 113, 16 S.Ct. 139, 40 L.Ed. 95 (1895) This is essentially the rule adopted by the Oklahoma Court in Barrett V. Barrett, 878 P.2d 1051 (Okl. 1994) when it cited with approval the Court's pronouncement in Britton v. Gannon. 285 P-2d 407 (Okl.1955) that state courts are:

"not required to recognize the judgment of a court of another state, territory, or country subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, where the court rendering the judgment was without jurisdiction or the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud."

Procedural differences between state courts and the other court system are not sufficient reasons to refuse recognition. Panama Processes v. Cities Service Inc.. 796 P.2d 276 (Okl.1990)

In this case, although Plaintiff claims no fraud or contravention of public policy, he does claim that tribal courts lacked criminal jurisdiction. However, in deciding whether togrant comity, the question is whether the Constitutional Tribal Court had jurisdiction to hear the matter, not whether the tribal courts had jurisdiction to enforce criminal laws. The answer to this question is clear. The Choctaw Constitution provides: "The Tribal Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide disputes, by vote of two (2) members, arising under any provision of this Constitution or any rule or regulation enacted by the Tribal Council."

Because the Tribal Court had subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff has failed to make a showing sufficient to defeat comity. The Court finds that the Tribal Court decree should be recognized. Just as this States highest court is best able to decide constitutional issues (subject to federal review), so too is the Choctaw Constitutional Tribal Court best able to decide its constitutional questions.

In Citizen State Bank v. Hall. 413 P.2d 513 (Okl. 1966), the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated:

"A final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive between the parties and their privies in a subsequent action involving the same subject matter, not only as to all matters litigated and determined in the former action, but also as to all matters germane to issues which could or might have been litigated
therein."

The Court finds that Plaintiff's state and federal due process and equal protection rights have not been violated by the cross-deputization agreements, and, although the matter may be subject to federal review, this court is bound by comity from reconsidering the constitutionality of the C.F.R. courts or the Choctaw criminal code. For these reasons,the Petition for declaratory and Injunctive Relief is hereby DENIED, and Defendant's Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED.

No. 90,028
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BOB BURLISON,

Appellant,

VS.

CITY OF ATOKA, ATOKA POLICE
DEPARTMENT, COUNTY OF ATOKA,
AT OKA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE,
COUNTY OF PUSHMATAHA, PUSHMATAHA
COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, CITY OF
CADDO, CADDO POLICE DEPARTMENT,
CITY OF DURANT, DURANT POLICE
DEPARTMENT, COUNTY OF BRYAN,
BRYAN COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE,
CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA, and
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,

Appellees.

Honorable Doug Gabbard III Trial Judge

Scott K. Morrison Douglas G. Dry, Wilburton, Oklahoma
For Appellant

Richard E. Mayfield, Atoka, Oklahoma
For City of Atoka & Atoka Police Dept.

Greg Jenkins
Assistant District Attorney
For Atoka Counyy, Bryan County, Atoka Co. Sheriff
and Bryan Co. Sheriff

Gayly L. Brock
Assistant District Attorney
For Pushmataha County and Idabel, Oklahoma

Pushmataha Co. Sheriff

Bob Rabon
Rabon, Wolf and Rabon
Hugo, Oklahoma

For City of Caddo and Choctaw Nation

P.L. Pat Phelps
Durant, Oklahoma

For City of Durant and Durant Police Dept.

Bruce Green
United States Attorney
Linda A. Epperley
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Muskogee, Oklahoma

For Bureau of
Indian Affairs

REIF, J.

This appeal concerns an arrangement under federal law for the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma to provide law enforcement of tribal law through cross-deputization agreements with various city and county law enforcement agencies. The federal law in question also provides for the Choctaw Nation to establish acourt to handle violations of tribal law that are referred by Choctaw tribal law enforcement offers to cross-deputized city and county officers Bob Burlison filed the suit below (1) asking for a declaratory judgment that this arrangement for enforcement of tribal law violated the Choctaw constitution and (2) seeking an injunction to prohibit the Choctaw Nation and the cross-deputized officers from the cities and countiesfrom enforcing tribal law under this arrangement. In a six-page order that thoroughly considered the law and issues, the trial court denied Mr. Burlison relief. The trial court dismissed this suit .I under comity on the basis of a Choctaw tribal Court judgment that held this arrangement did not violate the Choctaw Constitution. Upon review, this court summarily affirms the trial court under Supreme Court Rule.1.202(d), 12 O.S. Supp. 1997, ch. 15., app. 1, because the opinion of the trial court adequately explains the decision. AFFIRMED under Rule 1.202(d).

STUBBLEFIELD, P.J., and RAPP. J., concur

December 29, 1998

Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma,

Plaintiff,

VS.

Douglas Dry,
Juanita McConnell, and
Rosie Lee Burlison,

Defendants.

COME NOW Douglas Dry, Juanita McConnell, and Rosie Lee Burlison, Defendants in the above styled and numbered cause, by and through their attorney of record, Scott Kayla Morrison, and move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This Court does not have the authority to hear criminal matters.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDRED, the Defendants respectfully prays that the Court dismiss these causes for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I mailed first class postage prepaid the above and foregoing Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Robert L. Rabon on this 26th day of September, 1995.

Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma,

Plaintiff,

VS.

Douglas Dry,

Defendant.

No. CR-95-01

To the Honorable Judge of Said Court:

COMES NOW Douglas Dry, Defendant in the above styled and numbered cause, by and through his attorney of record, Scott Kayla Morrison, and moves the Court to disqualify and recuse himself from hearing any proceeding in the above cause, and in support thereof would show the Court as follows:

Judge James Wolfe is personally biased and prejudiced against the Defendant and said Defendant will be unable to receive a fair and impartial trial before such Judge.

This motion is made in good faith and not for the purpose of delay. Said motion has been filed sufficiently early before the trial date to cause no inconvenience or disruption of the proceedings.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Defendant prays that said judge will disqualify and recuse himself and that the Court will set this motion down at a future date for hearing thereon.

Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma,

Plaintiff,

VS.

Douglas Dry,
Rosie Lee Burlison, and
Juanita McConnell,

Defendants.

No. CR-95-03, 05

To the Honorable Judge of Said Court:

COMES NOW Juanita McConnell, Defendant in the above styled and numbered cause, by and through her attorney of record, Scott Kayla Morrison, and moves for severance from co-defendants Douglas Dry and Rosie Lee Burlison and in support thereof would show the Court as follows:

Defendant Douglas Dry has been charged with a separate and distinct crime of assaulting a police officer from co-defendant Juanita McConnell. Defendant McConnell will suffer prejudicial harm by evidence introduced to prove Dry's quilt or innocence.

Regardless of the trial court's instructions to the contrary, the jury will consider the co-defendant's alleged acts and declarations against Defendant McConnell, causing prejudice.

Defendant Rosie Lee Burlison has been charged with a separate and distinct crime of resisting arrest from co-defendant Juanita McConnell. Defendant McConnell will suffer prejudicial harm by evidence introduced to prove Burlison's guilt or innocence. Regardless of the trial court's instructions to the contrary, the jury will consider the co-defendant's acts and declarations against Defendant McConnell, causing prejudice.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Defendant Juanita McConnell prays that her case be severed from that of codefendants Douglas Dry and Rosie Lee Burlison and that she be tried alone.

STATE OF OKLAHOMA
COUNTY OF LATIMER

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, appeared on the 2nd day of October, 1995, and who being by me duly sworn did depose and state on her oath the following:

"My name is Juanita McConnell. I am the defendant in the above entitled and numbered cause. I have read the foregoing Motion for Severance and swear that it is true and correct."

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 2nd day of October,1995.

My Commission Expires: 12-18-96

I certify that I mailed first class postage prepaid the above and foregoing Motion for Severance to Robert L. Rabon on this 13th day of October, 1995.

Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma,

Plaintiff,

VS.

Douglas Dry,
Rosie Lee Burlison, and
Juanita McConnell,

Defendants.

No. CR-95-05,

To the Honorable Judge of Said Court:

COMES NOW Rosie Lee Burlison, Defendant in the above styled and numbered cause, by and through her attorney of record, Scott Kayla Morrison, and moves for severance from co-defendant Douglas Dry and in support thereof would show the Court as follows:

Defendant Douglas Dry has been charged with a separate and distinct crime of assaulting a police officer from co-defendant Rosie Lee Burlison. Defendant Burlison will suffer prejudicial harm by evidence introduced to prove Dry's guilt or innocence. Regardless of the trial court's instructions to the contrary, the jury will consider the co-defendant's alleged acts and declarations against Defendant Burlison, causing prejudice.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Defendant Rosie Lee Burlison prays that her case be severed from that of codefendant Douglas Dry and that she be tried alone.

STATE OF OKLAHOMA

COUNTY OF LATIMER

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, appeared on the day of October, 1995, and who being by me duly sworn did depose and state on her oath the following:

"My name is Rosie Lee Burlison. I am the defendant in the above entitled and numbered cause. I have read the foregoing Motion of or Severance and swear that it is true and correct.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 2nd day of October,
1995.

My Commission Expires: 12-18-97

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I mailed first class postage prepaid the above and foregoing Motion for Severance to Robert L. Rabon on this 13th day of October, 1995.

Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Douglas Dry,
Rosie Lee Burlison, and
Juanita McConnell,

Defendants.

No. CR-95-01, 02, 03, 04, 05

To The Honorable Judge of Said Court:

COME NOW, Douglas Dry, Rosie Lee Burlison, and Juanita McConnell, defendants in the above styled and numbered cause and moves this Court for an order changing the venue situs of the trial of this information herein to some other Code of Federal Regulations Court, such as the Court of Indian 0ffenses, Ada, Oklahoma, or Anadarko, Oklahoma. In support hereof, the defendants would show the Court as follows:

The defendants would show that the minds of the administration officials of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma presiding over and administering the jury pool are so prejudiced against these defendants and possess such fixed opinions as to :he guilt of the defendants, that a fair and impartial trial cannot be conducted herein. In support hereof the defendants would show as follows:

The affidavit enclosed herewith, designated as Exhibit "A," shows how the minds of the tribal officials administering the jury pool have become so extremely prejudiced against the defendants.

The current administration of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma owns and controls the official newspaper of the Choctaw Nation, the Bishinik, which is sent to all registered voters of the Choctaw Nation. This newspaper is an avenue for the administration which arrested and charged these defendants for peaceably exercising their right of free speech to prejudice the Choctaw citizens against these defendants. There is no other paper whose readership is the registered voters of the Choctaw Nation.

The current chief, Hollis Roberts, and the current tribal attorney, Bob Rabon, own, control or influence several newspapers Southeastern Oklahoma, including the Choctaw County Times, It Daily News, Latimer County Today, Talihina American, and ,ion Today. In addition to the Choctaw Nation's newspaper, the Bishinik, these newspapers are an avenue for the current admistration of the Choctaw Nation to prejudice the potential jurants against these defendants.

The potential jurors to hear this cause at trial are voters Choctaw Nation. These potential jurors will be chosen by Hampton, director of the voter registration department of the Choctaw Nation. Hampton is now and at all times has been an outspoken supporter of Hollis Roberts, Chief of the Choctaw Nation, and the defendant charged with rape and sexual assault. Hampton is a defendant in a suit filed by Dry on behalf of Morrison to obtain the list of registered voters of the Choctaw Nation. Further, Dry was a candidate in the recent election for chief of the Choctaw Nation, and represents two victims against Roberts and other tribal officials concerning events arising out of the federal criminal case pending against Roberts. Hampton is prejudiced against Dry and would choose an entire jury pool which voted in favor of the current administration, and continues to support the current administration. Since defendants does not have access to the voter registration list, there is no way to challenge the potential jurors selected by Hampton.

WHEREFORE, the defendants pray that the Court change the venue of this cause to some other Court of Indian Offenses in the State of Oklahoma, such as Court of Indian Offenses at Anadarko, Oklahoma, or Chickasaw Court of Indian Offenses at Ada, Oklahoma, where the defendants may have a fair and impartial trial.

I certify that I mailed first class postage prepaid the above and foregoing Application for Change of Venue to Robert L. Rabon, Rabon, Wolf and Rabon, Post office Box 726, Hugo, Oklahoma 74743 on this 30th day of October, 1995.

CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, appeared an the 20th day of October, 1995, and who being by me duly sworn did depose and state on her oath the following:

"My name is Rosie Lee Burlison. I am the defendant in the above entitled and numbered cause. I have read the foregoing Application for Change of Venue and swear that it is true and correct."

CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, appeared on the 30th day of October, 1995, and who being by me duly sworn did depose and state on his oath the following:

"My name is Douglas Dry. I am the defendant in the above entitled and numbered cause. I have read the foregoing Application for Change of Venue and swear that it is true and correct."

CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, appeared on the 30th day of October, 1995, and who being by me duly sworn did depose and state on her oath the following:

"My name is Juanita McConnell. I am the defendant in the above entitled and numbered cause. I have read the foregoing Application for Change of Venue and swear that it is true and correct.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 20th day of October, 1995.

My commission Expires: 12-18-96

Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma,

Plaintiff,

VS.

Douglas Dry,

Defendant.

No. CR-95-01, 02

To the Honorable Judge of Said Court:

COMES NOW Douglas Dry, defendant in the above styled and numbered cause, by his attorney of record, Scott Kayla Morrison, and moves this Court to quash and set aside the information filed herein, charging him with resisting arrest, assault on a police officer and attempt to intimidate police officer, and to abate said proceedings as to any further action and represent to the Court as follows:

Defendant Dry cannot be charged with resisting arrest, assaulting a Police officer and attempting to intimidate police officer where all charges arose out of the same struggle by defendant with Police. Ajeani v. State, 610 P.2d 820 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980). To charge and punish defendant for a portion of the same conduct a second time violates Choctaw
Criminal Codes Section 1-8, incorporating 21 O.S. Section 11.

Defendant Dry lawfully resisted in the taking, by force, of Dry's property from his person, as allowed in Choctaw
Criminal Codes Section 2-19 and 2-20. An unidentified man, not in uniformed, not identifiable as any law enforcement
personnel, and who did not identify himself as law enforcement personnel, attempted to take or injure Dry's camcorder bag from Dry's shoulder. Dry resisted this individual, whom he believed to be a thief, with the force necessary to protect his property, as allowed in Section 2-19 and 2-20.

This motion is made in good faith and not for dilatory purposes. The Defendant is entitled to the relief as herein prayed.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant Douglas Dry prays that the Court order that this Information be quashed and set aside and any further proceedings or hearings in the Court of Indian 0ffenses for the Choctaw Nation be abated.

CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, appeared on the 30th day of October, 1995, and who being by me duly sworn did depose and state on his oath the following:

"My name is Douglas Dry. I am the defendant in the above entitled and numbered cause. I have read the foregoing Motion to Quash and Set Aside Information and swear that it is true and correct."

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 12th day of October, 1995.

My Commission Expires: 12-18-96

I certify that I mailed first class postage prepaid the above and foregoing Motion to Quash and Set Aside Information to Robert L. Rabon, Rabon, Wolff and Rabon, Post Office Box 726, Hugo, Oklahoma, 74743 on this 30th day of October, 1995.

Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma,

Plaintiff,

VS.

Douglas Dry,
Rosie Lee Burlison, and
Juanita McConnell,

Defendants.

No. CR-95-05

To the Honorable Judge of Said Court:

COME NOW Douglas Dry, Rosie Lee Burlison, and Juanita McConnell, defendants in the above styled and numbered cause, by their attorney of record, Scott Kayla Morrison, and move this Court to quash and set aside the information filed herein, charging them with disturbing the peace, and to abate said proceedings as to any further action and represent to the Court as follows:

The information was based on constitutionally protected free speech. Defendants Douglas Dry, Rosie Lee Burlison, and Juanita McConnell have the right to free speech and the right to peaceably assemble under the United States Constitution, the Choctaw Constitution, the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.Section 1302, and the State of Oklahoma Constitution, and were exercising such rights on the morning September 4, 1995, when arrested by Choctaw Police.
Article IV of the Choctaw Constitution incorporates civil liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution of the Choctaw Nation provides:

"Nothing in this Constitution shall be interpreted in a way which would diminish the rights and privileges that tribal members have as citizens of this Nation, the State of Oklahoma, the United States of America, or under any Act of the Congress of the United States." The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that Congress shall make no law "abridging the freedom of speech, or ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble."

The Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. Section 1302 (1) guarantees that "no Indian tribe in exercising power of self government shall make or enforce any law 11 ... abridging the freedom of speech... or the right of the people to peaceably assemble."

The Choctaw constitution, Article IV, Section 3, provides: "The right that every member has to speak, write or publish his opinions on matters relating to the Choctaw Nation shall not be abridged." In Article IV, Section 4, the Choctaw Constitution guarantees that 'members shall have the right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble together for their common good."

The Constitution of the State of Oklahoma guarantees the liberty of speech in Article 2, Section 22, stating, "no law
stall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech... The right to assembly is guaranteed in Article 2, Section 3, stating "the people have the right peaceably to assemble for their own good..."

Defendants Douglas Dry, Rosie Lee Burlison and Juanita McConnell have a right to speak their opinions on matters relating to the Choctaw Nation by distributing pamphlets critical of the current administration of the Choctaw Nation, and the right to peaceably assemble with other Choctaw citizens. Any infringements on these rights are void under-the U.S. Constitution, the Indian Civil Rights Act, the Choctaw Constitution, and the State of Oklahoma Constitution. First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978).

The information was not endorsed as required by Section 4-303, Choctaw Criminal Procedures, which requires that the names and last known addresses of all the witnesses known to the Tribal Prosecutor at the time of the filing be endorsed and notice given to defense counsel.

This motion is made in good faith and not for dilatory purposes. The Defendants are entitled to the relief as herein prayed.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants pray that the court order that this Information be quashed and set aside and any further proceedings or hearings in the Court of Indian Offenses for the Choctaw Nation be abated.

CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, appeared an the 20th day of October, 1995, and who being by me duly sworn did depose and state on her oath the following:

"My name is Rosie Lee Burlison. I am the defendant in the above entitled and numbered cause. I have read the foregoing Motion to Quash and Set Aside Information and swear that it is true and correct."

CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, appeared on the 30th day of October, 1995, and who being by me duly sworn did depose and state on his oath the following:

"My name is Douglas Dry. I am the defendant in the above entitled and numbered cause. I have read the foregoing Motion to Quash and Set Aside Information and swear that it is true and correct."

CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, appeared on the 30th day of October, 1995, and who being by me duly sworn did depose and state on her oath the following:

"My name is Juanita McConnell. I am the defendant in the above entitled and numbered cause. I have read the foregoing Motion to Quash and Set Aside Information and swear that it is true and correct.

I certify that I mailed first class postage prepaid the above and foregoing Motion to Quash and Set Aside Information to Robert L. Rabon, Rabon, Wolf, and Rabon, Post Office Box 726, Hugo, Oklahoma, 74743 on this 30th day of October, 1995.

Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma,
Plaintiff,

VS.

Douglas Dry,
Defendant.

No. CR-95-01, 02, 05

To the Honorable Judge of Said Court:

COMES NOW Douglas Dry, Defendant in the above styled and numbered cause, by and through his attorney of record, Scott Kayla Morrison, and moves the Court to dismiss the pending Motion for Disqualification of Trial the Court, and in support thereof will show the Court as follows:

Upon review of the 1983 Constitution of the Choctaw Nation, it is clear that Chief Hollis Roberts would appoint any and all judges to the bench of this Court. The justice system is inherently biased, regardless of who sits on the bench.

Since Chief Roberts would be appointing any replacement in the event Judge James Wolfe recused himself, it would cause greater concern for defendant, given the fact of Chief Roberts current pending federal criminal charges, of who Chief Roberts would appoint to replace Judge Wolfe.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Defendant prays that the Court withdraws the Motion for Disqualification of Trial Judge currently pending before this court.

Certificate of Service

I cerrtify that I personally mailed by first- class mail the above and foregoing Motion to Withdraw Motion to Disqualify Judge to Judge James Wolfe, and Robert L. Rabon, on this 23rd day of January, 1996.

Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma,
Plaintiff,

VS.

Douglas Dry,
Defendant.

No. CR-95-01, 05

To the Honorable Judge of Said Court:

COMES NOW Douglas Dry, Defendant in the above styled and numbered cause, by and through his attorney of record, Scott Kayla Morrison, and moves the Court to disqualify and recuse Tribal Prosecutor, Robert L. Rabon, from participating in any proceedings in the above cause, and in support thereof would show the court as follows:

Robert L. Rabon represented the Choctaw Council, the legislative body of the Choctaw Nation, in a civil matter before the Choctaw Tribal Court on October 12, 1996, in which Douglas G. Dry was a defendant.

Robert L. Rabon is tribal prosecutor of this court, the judicial branch of the Choctaw Nation.

To allow Rabon to continue to function as a representative both the legislative and judicial branches of government would violate Article V of the Choctaw Constitution and the U.S. Court withdraws the Motion for Disqualification of Trial Judge currently pending before this court.

I certify that I personally mailed by first class mail the above and foregoing Motion to Withdraw Motion to Disqualify Judge to Judge James Wolfe, and Robert L. Rabon on this 23rd day of January, 1997.

Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma,
Plaintiff,

VS.

Douglas Dry,
Defendant.

No. CR-95-01, 05

To the Honorable Judge of Said Court:

COMES NOW Douglas Dry, Defendant in the above styled and numbered cause, by and through his attorney of record, Scott Kayla Morrison, and moves the Court to disqualify and recuse Tribal Prosecutor, Robert L. Rabon, from participating in any proceedings in the above cause, and in support thereof would show the Court as follows:

Robert L. Rabon represented the Choctaw Council, the legislative body of the Choctaw Nation, in a civil matter before the Choctaw Tribal Court on August 23, 1996, in which Douglas G. Dry was a defendant.

Robert L. Rabon is tribal prosecutor of this court, the judicial branch of the Choctaw Nation.

To allow Rabon to continue to function as a representative of both the legislative and judicial branches of government would violate Article v of the Choctaw constitution and the U.S. Constitution.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Defendant prays that the Court will disqualify and recuse Tribal Prosecutor, Robert L. Rabon, and that the Court will set this motion down at a future date for hearing thereon.

I certify that I personally mailed by first class mail the above and foregoing Motion to Withdraw Motion to Disqualify Judge to Judge James Wolfe, and Robert L. Rabon on this 24rd day of January, 1997.

Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma,
Plaintiff,

VS.

Juanita McConnell, and Rosie Lee Burlison,
Defendants.

No. CR-95-03, 04, 05

COME NOW Juanita McConnell, and Rosie Lee Burlison, Defendants in the above styled and numbered cause, by and through their attorney of record, Scott Kayla Morrison, and move to stay proceedings pending appeal on the denial of their motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. To require defendants to prepare a defense in a court that may not have subject matter jurisdiction would create hardship on the defendants.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Defendants respectfully prays that the Court stays proceedings pending appeal on the order denying defendants, motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I certify that I mailed first class postage prepaid the above and foregoing Second Amended Motion to Disqualify Tribal Prosecutor, to Robert L. Rabon, Rabon, Wolfe, and Rabon, on this 27th day of January, 1997.

Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma,

Plaintiff,

Vs.

Douglas Dry,
Rosie Lee Burlison, and
Juanita McConnell,

Defendants.

No. CR-95-01, 05

Comes now Bob Rabon and specially appears only for the purpose of this motion and respectfully shows to the Court:

(1) That the movant has received a subpoena from this Court commanding his appearance as a witness before the Court of Indian 0ffenses of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma an August 15, 1997; that said subpoena does not identify the party who requested it. However, movant assumes it was issued at the request of one of the defendants.

(2) Movant further shows to the Court that his law partner, Robert L. Rabon, is the attorney for the prosecuting party; that it is not ethical for an attorney to be a witness in a cause wherein either he or a law partner are acting as counsel.

(3) Defendants have been actively seeking the disqualification of the prosecutor in this case; the attorney for defendants is also the attorney for Douglas Dry in a federal civil suit in which movant is the attorney for four of the defendants.

She has informed the Court that she intends to try to make movant a witness in that case and seek his disqualification there.

(4) This effort to draw movant in this case as a witness is designed for purposes of harassment and to further the attorney's cause in disqualifying the prosecutor in this case and movant in the federal case.

Wherefore, movant requests that the Court quash the said subpoena.

I hereby certify that on the 1st day of August, 1997, 1 mailed a true and correct copy of the above Special Appearance and Motion to Quash Subpoena to Scott Kayla Morrison, P.O. Box (337, Wilburton, OK 74578, with full postage prepaid thereon.

Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma,

Plaintiff, vs. Douglas Dry,

Defendant.

No. CR-95-01, 05

Comes now the defendant. Douglas G. Dry, and withdraws subpoenas issued on July 24, 1997 for Sheldon Sperling, Assistant U.S. Attomey, and for his reasons, affirms and states:

1. The U.S. Attomey's Office has taken the position that this Court does not have jurisdiction over federal employees. apparently for any purpose.

2. For defendant to challenge this position, it would require time, energy and financial resources. With this defense and other actions currently pending, defendant is without current resources to mount the defense required to take this issue to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Wherefore. defendant, Douglas Dry, withdraws subpoenas issued to Sheldon Sperling for the above reasons.

Respectfully submitted,

I certify that I hand-delivered the above and foregoing Withdrawal Without Prejudice of Subpoena to Robert L. Rabon, Rabon, Wolfe, and Rabon. Post Office Box 726, Hugo. OK 74743, on this 12th day of August, 1997.