Roosevelt Wade, Wilhemina Harp, )
as individuals and as a representative )
class of Choctaw citizens, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
VS. ) Case No. C-80-2
)
Hollis Roberts, in his official )
capacity as Chief of the Choctaw )
Nation of Oklahoma, and Robert )
L. Gardner, in his official )
capacity as Assistant Chief of )
the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, )
)
Defendants. )

This case began on August 26, 1980, when the Plaintiffs herein filed their Petition seeking a declaratory judgement, an order requiring repayment of certain monies, and an injunction prohibiting the Chief of the Choctaw Nation, or any of his agents or subordinates from disposing of any tribal property without having first obtained approved of the Tribal Council.
Mr. Jimmy L. Sam of McAlester, Oklahoma, represented the Plaintiffs in the case, while Mr. Bob Rabon, of Hugo, Oklahoma, represented the Chief and the Assistant Chief.

The case proceeded through the issue-joining phases and a pre-trial conference, and on February 28, 1981, came on trial on its merits. After the introduction of exhibits into evidence, testimony of witnesses, and the argument of counsel, the court reached its decision with each of the judges concurring in the result.

The court found, from the evidence, that there had been payments made from the Arkansas Riverbed Account and its interest account for purposes which had not been addressed or approved by the Tribal Council. The testimony also disclosed that the Chief had ceased this practice of making loans and transfers from these accounts during the month of May 1980. The court also found that the Tribal Council came into existence in September 1979.

It is noted here that although the purposes of the payments and loans from the Arkansas Riverbed Accounts were many and varied and ranged from payments for repairing electrical wiring of the caretaker's house located on the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma Tribal grounds, to payments for supportive services when a member's house burned; very often larger transfers were made to ease cash flow problems encountered while administering programs such as Youth Action Conservation Corps, Community Health Representatives, and Choctaw Headstart.

After reviewing the evidence and the Constitution, and deliberating, the court found and concluded that the provisions of Article XI, Section 6 and 8, of the Constitution of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, contemplate exclusive dominion of the legislative branch of the Choctaw Nation over decisions pertaining to the "acquisition, leasing, disposition and management of tribal property."

The court further finds and concludes that "property" as that term is used in section 6 of Article IX shall include intangible personal property such as monies in accounts with financial institutions, as well as tangible personal property and real estate. The term "tribal" which proceeds the term property in section 6 of Article IX, limits the scope of the section to the effect that the legislative branch control over tribal property shall only apply to property, the title to which shall have passed from any source to the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma.

Section 5 of Article VII provides: "The Chief shall prepare an annual tribal budget which shall be submitted to the Tribal Council at least thirty (30) days prior to the beginning of the tribal fiscal year." From this annual budget the Council adopts legislation approving the annual budget (Art. IX, §8).

We find the intent of the ultimate source of legislative authority, the Choctaw people, was to the effect that the Chief would submit a proposed annual budget and that thereafter, the Council would adopt a budget therefrom. The Chief would have the power to veto the legislative act adopting the annual budget and then the Council would be required to either adopt new legislation regarding the budget which the Chief would not veto, or else override the Chief's veto in accordance with the provisions of section 10 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Although this court is not a legislative body and will not engage in the policy making function, it is recommended that the legislative branch consider the problems of the executive branch in administering tribal problems of the executive branch in administering tribal programs and address itself to promulgating legislation which will facilitate ease in managing unforseen contingencies.

Insofar as the Plaintiffs' Prayer requesting the court enter its order requiring repayment of monies illegally spent from the Arkansas Riverbed account and its interest account, is concerned, we find that since the Plaintiffs are seeking an Order requiring the Defendants to retrieve the money and to pay it back into the original accounts and not that they repay the money from their own private funds, it is unnecessary to enter such an order and therefore no such order will be entered. We find that monies in other tribal accounts are still Choctaw money and it would be futile to enter an order as prayed for. We do recommend that in instances where loans were made from the accounts, that there should be reasonable efforts made on the part of the tribe to enforce repayment of them.

Finally, and briefly, in deciding that portion of the Plaintiffs' Petition wherein they seek injunctive relief, we note that since the practice of making the loans and transfers complained of had been voluntarily stopped by the Chief and Assistant Chief several months prior to the filing of the Petition herein, and since injunctive relief would not be appropriate as to any person not made a party to this action, and for the further reason that this declaration of Choctaw law when considered with the provisions of the Constitution provides guidance on the issues joined herein, no injunctive relief shall be ordered.

Dated this 9th day of May, 1981.

JOE C. TAYLOR, Presiding Judge

I concur in the above and foregoing decision.
CHARLEY G. JONES, Judge and ED CURTIS, Judge

Filed for record this 9th day of May, 1981.